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Paying for the Sins of Their Clients: The
EEOC's Position that Staffing Firms Can Be
Liable When Their Clients Terminate an
Assigned Employee for a Discriminatory
Reason
Daniel P. O'Gorman*
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or
Commission) takes the remarkable position that an employment staffing
firm' should be liable under the federal employment-discrimination
statutes2 when the firm's client terminates an employee assignment for a
discriminatory reason, unless the firm takes "corrective measures within
its control."3  The position is remarkable because it presumes an
employer can be liable for an adverse employment action taken by
neither it nor any of its agents. It also presumes an employer can be
liable when neither it nor any of its agents acted with a discriminatory
motive.
* Assistant Professor, University of Central Florida, Department of Criminal
Justice and Legal Studies; Adjunct Professor of Law, Barry University School of Law; Of
Counsel, Ford & Harrison LLP, Orlando, Florida. B.A., summa cum laude, University of
Central Florida, 1990; J.D., cum laude, New York University, 1993. The views
expressed in this article are those of the author alone. I would like to thank M. Susan
Sacco for her helpful comments during the preparation of this article.
1. I use the term "staffing firm" to refer to any business entity that places workers
with, or leases employees to, client companies, including those entities referred to as
"professional employer organizations," "employee leasing companies," "temporary
employment agencies," "contract firms," and "payroll services." For a discussion of the
various types of arrangements between staffing firms and their clients, see Jason E.
Pirruccello, Note, Contingent Worker Protection from Client Company Discrimination:
Statutory Coverage, Gaps, and the Role of the Common Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 191, 196-
97 (2005).
2. Such statutes include Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29
U.S.C. § § 621-634 (2000), and Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2000).
3. EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Application of EEO Laws to Contingent Workers
Placed by Temporary Employment Agencies and Other Staffing Firms, 3 EEOC
Compliance Manual N:3317 (Dec. 3, 1997) [hereinafter EEOC Enforcement Guidance].
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The EEOC is attempting to extend the rule of liability for coworker
and third-party harassment to tangible employment actions by third
parties, despite such extension being inconsistent with the statutes.
While no one disagrees that "a staffing firm must hire and make job
assignments in a non-discriminatory manner,"4 the EEOC's position that
a staffing firm can be liable for a client's discriminatory termination of
an employee assignment should be rejected by the courts.
Part I of this article discusses general concepts that will help lay the
groundwork for showing that the EEOC's position is incorrect. Part II
examines the EEOC's position, announced in its 1997 Enforcement
Guidance, that a staffing firm should be liable for a client's
discrimination against an assigned employee if the firm fails to take
corrective measures within its control. Part III analyzes the judicial
decisions, if any, that support the EEOC's position. Lastly, Part IV
demonstrates that the EEOC's position has no support in the statutes, and
therefore should be rejected.
I
The primary employment discrimination statutes are Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 5 which prohibits discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin; 6 the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),7 which prohibits
discrimination based on age; 8 and Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),9 which prohibits discrimination based
on disability. 10 To establish a claim against an employer "1 under any of
the statutes, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant is an
"employer" as that term is defined under the applicable statute; (2) the
plaintiff was discriminated against for a prohibited reason; (3) the
discrimination related to the plaintiffs employment; and (4) the
4. Id. atN:3317.
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
6. Id. § 2000e-2(a). The Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000), also
prohibits pay discrimination based on sex.
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
8. Id. § 623(a).
9. 42U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117(2000).
10. Id. § 12112(a).
11. Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA also prohibit discrimination by employment
agencies and labor organizations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b), (c) (2000); 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(b), (c); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (2000). The ADA further prohibits discrimination by
joint labor-management committees. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (2000). This article does not
address the liability of staffing firms in the referral process based on their status as
employment agencies.
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defendant is liable for the discrimination. 12 Certain matters regarding
these elements should be emphasized to help understand how the law
properly applies when a plaintiff seeks to hold a staffing firm liable for
the discriminatory termination of his or her assignment by the firm's
client.
A. The Defendant Must be an "Employer"
Each statute prohibits discrimination by an "employer" as that term
is defined by the statutes. 13 Under Title VII and the ADA, an employer
is defined as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who
has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any
agent of such a person .... ,,14 Under the ADEA, an employer is defined
as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty
or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year [and] any agent
of such a person . ,, The "current" year is the year in which the
alleged discriminatory act occurred. '
6
If two or more nominally separate entities are an "integrated
enterprise," the employees of the entities can be combined to have each
entity reach the number of employees needed to be an "employer.
1 7
This is known as the "single employer" doctrine.' 8 Similarly, a person
can be employed by two or more entities that are in fact distinct, and the
person will be counted as an employee of each entity to determine
whether either entity is an "employer."' 9 This is known as the "joint
employer" doctrine.
20
When determining if an entity has enough employees to be an
"employer," the entity's independent contractors are not counted.2'
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000); 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a) (2000).
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) (prohibiting an "employer" from committing
unlawful employment practice); id. § 12111(2) (defining "covered entity" as including,
among others, an "employer"); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000) (prohibiting an "employer"
from discriminating).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000); id. § 1211 1(5)(A). The ADA's definition uses the
numerals "15" and "20." See id. § 1211 1(5)(A).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2000).
16. Dumas v. Town of Mount Vernon, 612 F.2d 974, 979 n.4 (5th Cir. 1980),
overruled in part on other grounds by Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
17. Anderson v. Pac. Mar. Ass'n, 336 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2003).
18. Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach, 166 F.3d 1332, 1341 (11 th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
19. Virgo v. Riviera Beach Assocs., 30 F.3d 1350, 1359-60 (11 th Cir. 1994). See 27
AM. JUR. 2D Employment Relationships § 5 (1996).
20. Virgo, 30 F.3d at 1359-60.
21. Rao v. Kenya Airways, Ltd., No. 94 Civ. 6103 (CSH), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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Thus, whether a person is an employee or an independent contractor of
the defendant is relevant to determining if the defendant has enough
employees to be an "employer." Whether a person is an employee or an
independent contractor under the statutes is a question of federal law.
22
The statutes simply define "employee" as "an individual employed
by an [or any] employer., 23 Lacking greater guidance, lower courts have
applied three different tests to determine if a person is an employee or an
independent contractor. Some apply the common-law test of agency,
which focuses on the hiring party's right to control the worker.24 Others
apply the so-called economic-realities test,25 which focuses on whether
the worker is, "as a matter of economic fact, in business for himself."
26
Yet others apply a hybrid of the common-law test and the economic-
realities test.27  In Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v.
Wells 28 the Supreme Court held that the common-law's focis on control
applied to determining "whether four physicians actively engaged in
medical practice as shareholders and directors of a professional
corporation should be counted as 'employees"' under the ADA,29 thereby
providing support for the position that the common-law test also applies
to determine who is an independent contractor and who is an employee.
30
When a plaintiff sues a staffing firm for a client's discrimination,
whether the firm is an "employer" involves simply determining if it had
enough employees in the year the alleged discriminatory act occurred, or
in the preceding year, using the term "employee" as interpreted by the
courts.31 If it did, whether it employed the plaintiff is irrelevant to this
8416, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1995).
22. Calderon v. Martin County, 639 F.2d 271, 272-73 (5th Cir. Unit B Mar. 1981).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2000); id. § 12111(4); 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (2000). The
ADEA uses the phrase "any employer." 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (2000).
24. Camacho v. P.R. Ports Auth., 369 F.3d 570, 573-74 (1st Cir. 2004).
25. Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
26. Oestman v. Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 303, 305 (10th Cir. 1992).
27. Garrett v. Phillips Mills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979, 981 (4th Cir. 1983).
28. 538 U.S. 440 (2003).
29. Id. at 442, 449.
30. See also Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (adopting
common-law agency test for determining who is an "employee" under the Employee
Retirement Income Sccurity Act of 1974).
31. See, e.g., Blagg v. Tech. Group, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1187 (D. Colo.
2004) (holding that consultants placed by defendant with clients were not defendant's
employees and were therefore not included to determine if the defendant was an
"employer" under Title VII); March v. Technical Employment Servs., Inc., No. 98-636-
M, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2645, at *10-12 (D.N.H. Mar. 3, 2000) (holding, for purposes
of determining if a staffing firm was an "employer," that temporary workers were
employees of the staffing firm because it exercised sufficient control over their
employment); Kellam v. Snelling Pers. Servs., 866 F. Supp. 812, 816 (D. Del. 1994)
(holding that workers that were placed with clients were not employees of staffing firm,
and thus were not to be included in determining whether the staffing firm had fifteen or
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element of the case. This flows from the fact that the definition of
''employer" is based on the number of employees employed by the
employer, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is, or was, one of them.
B. Discrimination for Prohibited Reason
The employment discrimination statutes only prohibit
discrimination based on the plaintiffs race, color, religion, sex, national
origin, age, or disability.3 2  Thus, an employer can take an adverse
employment action against a person "for a good reason, a bad reason, a
reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its
action is not for a discriminatory reason., 33 When the plaintiff asserts a
disparate-treatment claim, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant
engaged in intentional discrimination.
34
C. An Employment Relationship
For a defendant to be liable under the statutes, the defendant must
have taken an adverse action against the plaintiff regarding his or her
employment.35 Thus, "a plaintiff must have some connection with an
more employees), affd, 65 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 1995).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)
(2000).
33. Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Commc'ns, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1984).
34. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988) (Title VII);
Tsombanidis v. W. Haven Fire Dep't, 352 F.3d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 2003) (ADA);
Schaffner v. Glencoe Park Dist., 256 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 2001) (ADEA). There are
two types of discrimination claims: disparate treatment and disparate impact. The
difference has been explained as follows with respect to Title VII claims:
"Disparate treatment". . . is the most easily understood type of discrimination.
The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of
their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory
motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere
fact of differences in treatment ....
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that stress
"disparate impact." The latter involve employment practices that are facially
neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly
on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity. Proof
of discriminatory motive ... is not required under a disparate-impact theory.
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (citations
omitted). An ADA claim can also be established without discriminatory intent if an
employer fails to reasonably accommodate an employee with a disability. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
35. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000) (making it unlawful for an employer "to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment .... ); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(l) (2000) (making it an unlawful for an
employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
2007]
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employment relationship for [the statutes'] protections to apply,"3 6 and
whether a person is an employee or an independent contractor is
therefore relevant to determining if the statutes protect him or her. A
person placed by a staffing firm with a client will usually, at a minimum,
be considered the client's employee.37
The statutes prohibit an employer from discriminating against any
"individual, 38 not just against an employer's employee. Most circuit
courts therefore hold that an employer can violate the statutes by
discriminating against a person who is not its employee if the
discrimination involves the person's employment with another entity.39
The classic example of this is Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson,4 0 in
which the court held that a hospital could be liable under Title VII if it
refused to allow a male nurse, who was not the hospital's employee, to
treat female patients at the hospital.4' The court held that if the hospital
discriminated against the plaintiff concerning his employment with his
employer, it was irrelevant that the hospital did not employ him.
42
or privileges of employment .... "); id. § 12112(a) (prohibiting discrimination "in regard
to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees,
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.").
36. Gina M. Delahunt, Comment, Pointing Fingers-Will the Real Employer Please
Stand Up! When is an Entity an Employer in a Sexual Harassment Claim?, 7 J. SMALL &
EMERGING Bus. L. 501, 507 (2003); see also Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47, 633
F.2d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 1980) ("[T]here must be some connection with an employment
relationship for Title VII to apply.").
37. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Orange & Rockland Utils., Inc., 04 Civ. 0207 (WCC),
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42466, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2005) (finding that a temporary
employee was employed by the company with which she was placed); Adams v.
Debevoise & Plimpton, No. 03 Civ. 3015 (AKH), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14914, at *6-7
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2004) (finding that a temporary legal secretary was employed by a law
firm); Amarnare v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 611 F. Supp. 344, 349
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding that a temporary employee was likely employed by the
company with which she was placed), affd, 770 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1985).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000); id. § 12112(a); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000).
39. Pirruccello, supra note 1, at 202.
40. 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
41. Id. at 1342.
42. Id.; see also Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., 698 F.2d 1019, 1021-22 (9th Cir.
1983) (holding that the plaintiff stated a claim when he alleged that the defendant refused
to enter into a contract with his corporation for discriminatory reasons, under which the
plaintiff, as an employee of his corporation, would have served as a director of an
emergency room); King v. Chrysler Corp., 812 F. Supp. 151, 154 (E.D. Mo. 1993)
(holding that a cashier employed at a cafeteria on the premises of an automobile company
could assert a claim against the automobile company for failing to prevent sexually
harassing work environment); Fairman v. Saks Fifth Ave. of Mo., Inc., No. 87-0394-CV-
W-3, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13087, at *6-7 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 18, 1988) (holding that a
plaintiff who performed cleaning services at a store on behalf of her employer could
assert a claim against the store who terminated her services); Amarnare, 611 F. Supp. at
349-50 (holding that a client of a temporary employment agency could be liable for
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This is known as an "interference claim," because the employer
interferes with the plaintiffs employment with a third party. 43 Thus, if
someone employs the plaintiff, and the defendant (who must be an
"employer") is accused of discriminating against the plaintiff concerning
his or her employment, whether the defendant employs the plaintiff is
relevant only to determine if the defendant has enough employees to be
an "employer."
D. Holding the Defendant Liable
Because a business entity acts only through natural persons, 44 an
employer is liable under the statutes only if there is a basis for holding it
responsible for the act of the person who discriminated. Although
Congress did not explicitly address employer liability in the statutes, 5
the definition of "employer" includes "any agent" of the employer.46
Thus, "[t]he plain language of the Act imposes liability for
discrimination by any agent, 47 and, as a result, the Supreme Court has
stated that "Congress ... directed federal courts to interpret Title VII
based on agency principles. 48
Though the statutes do not define "agent," and while it is unclear if
Congress intended to incorporate common-law doctrines,49 the Supreme
discriminating against a temporary worker even if the client was not the worker's
employer), affd, 770 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1985); Pao v. Holy Redeemer Hosp., 547 F.
Supp. 484, 494-95 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (holding that a physician stated a claim against a
hospital that was not his employer, when the hospital denied him staff privileges);
Puntolillo v. N.H. Racing Comm'n, 375 F. Supp. 1089, 1092 (D.N.H. 1974) (holding that
the plaintiff stated a claim against defendants, who were not his employers, because they
allegedly interfered with his employment opportunities).
43. Pirruccello, supra note 1, at 200. The EEOC has stated that an interference
claim cannot be asserted against a federal agency because claims under Title VII and the
ADEA can only be asserted against the federal government by "employees or applicants
for employment." EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 3, at N:3322. Also, the
Equal Pay Act of 1963, "unlike Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA, only permits claims
by employees against their employers, not against third party interferers." Id. at N:3326
n.39.
44. Niesig v. Team I, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 1033 (N.Y. 1990).
45. See Kathleen A. Smith, Note, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment:
Inconsistency Under Title VII, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 245, 259 (1987) ("Although title VII
makes it unlawful for 'an employer' to discriminate ... it does not specify the basis for
employer liability arising from discrimination.").
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000); id. § 1211 1(5)(A); 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2000).
47. John B. Attanasio, Equal Justice Under Chaos: The Developing Law of Sexual
Harassment, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 32 (1982).
48. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998); see also Meritor
Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) ("Congress wanted courts to look to
agency principles for guidance in th[e] area [of employer liability].").
49. Christine 0. Merriman & Cora G. Yang, Note, Employer Liability for Coworker
Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 83, 96 (1984-85).
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Court has cited the Restatement (Second) of Agency with approval when
determining employer liability. 50 The EEOC also has taken the position
"that courts formulating employer liability rules should draw from
traditional agency principles.' One court stated that the use of "agent"
in the definition of "employer" is "an unremarkable expression of
respondeat superior-that discriminatory personnel actions taken by an
employer's agent may create liability for the employer., 52 The Supreme
Court relies "on the general common law of agency, rather than the law
of any particular State ....
While the general common law of agency provides the "starting
point" for an analysis of employer liability,54 the Supreme Court has
stated that courts should not simply transplant common-law doctrines
into the statutes, but rather should "adapt agency concepts to [the
statutes'] practical objectives .... ,5 The Court, however, has also
stated that
[w]hile such common-law principles may not be transferable in all
their particulars to Title VII, Congress' decision to define "employer"
to include any "agent" of an employer, surely evinces an intent to
place some limits on the acts of employees for which employers
under Title VII are to be held responsible.
When an employee, for a discriminatory reason, takes a tangible
50. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. In 2006, the American Law Institute published the
Restatement (Third) of Agency. Interestingly, the Restatement (Third) of Agency "does
not deal extensively with the duties that an employer owes its employees [because] [s]uch
duties are now extensively prescribed by statute and administrative regulation and
enforced to a considerable degree through processes external to the civil-justice system."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, Introduction (2006). Also, the Third Restatement's
treatment of respondeat superior "is inapplicable to an employer's liability for one
employee's tortious conduct toward a fellow employee, a topic being considered by
Restatement Third, Employment Law, in preparation as Restatement Third, Agency, was
completed." Id. § 7.07 cmt. a. Notwithstanding, because the Supreme Court has held
that general principles of agency law apply to determining liability under the federal
employment discrimination statutes, the Restatement (Third) of Agency is relevant to
determining employer liability, and it is therefore relied on in this article when discussing
general agency law.
51. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70 (noting that the "[tihe EEOC, in its brief as amicus
curiae, contends that courts formulating employer liability rules should draw from
traditional agency principles.").
52. Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 510 (4th Cir. 1994).
53. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 754 (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740 (1989)).
54. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 802 (1998).
55. Id. at 802 n.3; see also Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(MacKinnon, J., concurring) ("Analysis of liability of an employer for violation of Title
VII takes us beyond the common law of agency and tort, but the rules operative in those
spheres provide a necessary starting point.").
56. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
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employment action against a subordinate employee, "such as hiring,
firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits, '57
the employer is liable because the employee who took the action used the
power given to him or her by the employer.58 Under traditional agency
law, this is a situation in which an employer can be held liable for an
employee's act. 59
The liability rules for discriminatory harassment are more complex.
When a person sufficiently high in the organization-such as the
president, an owner, or an officer-subjects a subordinate to
discriminatory harassment, the employer is automatically liable.6 °
When a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate but no tangible
employment action is taken, the employer is liable unless it can establish
"(a) that [it] exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
any . . . harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. 61
The Supreme Court developed this rule to accommodate the fact that a
harassing supervisor is often aided by the agency relationship (thus
suggesting liability under common-law agency principles) 62 with several
competing considerations. These competing considerations include:
(1) "Congress' intention to promote conciliation rather than litigation in
the Title VII context;" 63 (2) promoting Title VII's deterrent purpose by
57. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 761.
58. Id. at 760.
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958) (providing that an
employer is liable for the tort of an employee committed outside the scope of
employment if "he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency
relationship"). Under the Restatement (Third) of Agency, this doctrine is not included as
a distinct basis for vicarious liability. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.08 cmt.
b (2006) ("This Restatement does not include 'aided in accomplishing' as a distinct basis
for an employer's (or principal's) vicarious liability."). Rather, the American Law
Institute believes that "[tihe purposes likely intended to be met by the 'aided in
accomplishing' basis are satisfied by a more fully elaborated treatment of apparent
authority and by the duty of reasonable care that a principal owes to third parties with
whom it interacts through employees and other agents." Id.
60. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 789 (stating that an employer's president would be
"within that class of an employer organization's officials who may be treated as the
organization's proxy" and whose harassment of a subordinate would subject the
employer to liability); Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that a
supervisor may hold a position sufficiently high "in the management hierarchy of the
company for his actions to be imputed automatically to the employer"); Katz v. Dole, 709
F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating that an employer would be liable for harassment by
a "proprietor, partner or corporate officer").
61. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 765.
62. Id. at 764.
63. Id.
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encouraging employees to report harassing conduct before it becomes
severe or pervasive; 64 and (3) implementing the "avoidable consequences
doctrine" of tort law, which applies to Title VII.
65
If a coworker harasses another employee for a discriminatory
reason, lower courts agree that the employer is liable if the plaintiff
establishes that the employer knew or should have known of the
harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action.66 This is a
negligence standard of liability. 67  If the employer fails to adequately
respond to coworker harassment, it is liable even if the harassment stops
after the employer knew or should have known about it. 68  Liability
attaches in such a situation because the liability rule for coworker
harassment has two purposes-"ending the current harassment and
deterring future harassment... by the same offender or others"-and a
failure to respond does not deter future harassment.69 Although it has
never explicitly approved the doctrine, the Supreme Court has suggested
support for the negligence-based liability rule for coworker harassment.70
An agency-law basis for the liability rule for coworker harassment
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Moore v. Kuka Welding Sys., 171 F.3d 1073, 1079 (6th Cir. 1999); Waltman v.
Int'l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 485 (5th Cir. 1989); Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 726
F.2d 424, 427 (8th Cir. 1984); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (1 1th Cir.
1982); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d); BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 244 (1992). The rule regarding employer liability
for coworker harassment has been described as "not a controversial area." 3 L. LARSON &
A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 46.07[4][a], at 46-101 (2d ed. 1998).
67. Robert F. Conte & David L. Gregory, Sexual Harassment in Employment-Some
Proposals Toward More Realistic Standards of Liability, 32 DRAKE L. REV. 407, 409
(1982-83); see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 789 (1998) ("[T]he
combined knowledge and inaction may be seen as demonstrable negligence .... ); id. at
799 (referring to the standard as "a negligence standard").
68. Fuller v. City of Oakland, Cal., 47 F.3d 1522, 1528-29 (9th Cir. 1995).
Significantly, the Supreme Court described the standard as follows: "An employer is
negligent with respect to sexual harassment if it knew or should have known about the
conduct and failed to stop it." Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759
(1998) (emphasis added). This suggests that liability attaches only if the harassment
continues after the employer knew or should have known of it. This is consistent with
the Court's statement that an employer's liability under this standard is based on the
agency principle that an employer is liable for an employee's tort outside the scope of
employment "when the tort is attributable to the employer's own negligence." Id. at 758.
69. Fuller, 47 F.3d at 1528-29.
70. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 789 ("There have.., been myriad cases in which
District Courts and Courts of Appeals have held employers liable on account of actual
knowledge by the employer, or high-echelon officials of an employer organization, of
sufficiently harassing action by subordinates, which the employer or its informed officers
have done nothing to stop .... In such instances, the combined knowledge and inaction
may be seen as demonstrable negligence, or as the employer's adoption of the offending
conduct and its results, quite as if they had been authorized affirmatively as the
employer's policy.").
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is difficult to discern. Agency law is not a good fit because an employer
is generally liable only for an employee's torts within the scope of his or
her employment.7 ' Coworker harassment cannot be said to occur within
such scope, particularly because a coworker does not have any authority
over the person he or she harasses. Also, an employee who harasses
rarely does so for the employer's benefit, which is generally a
72requirement for tortious conduct to be within the scope of employment.
The Supreme Court, without passing on their correctness, has
acknowledged two bases for the coworker harassment liability rule,
stating that "combined knowledge and inaction may be seen as
demonstrable negligence, or as the employer's adoption of the offending
conduct and its results, quite as if they had been authorized affirmatively
as the employer's policy. ' 73 Neither of these rationales, however, is an
adequate basis for the rule, and neither is consistent with the statutes'
requirement that either the employer or its agent engage in intentional
discrimination.
The negligence rationale is questionable because an employer is
liable when it fails to respond, even if the harassment stops once the
employer knew or should have known of it. 74 Under common law, "[a]n
essential element of the plaintiffs cause of action for negligence, or for
that matter for any other tort, is that there be some reasonable connection
between the act or omission of the defendant and the damage which the
plaintiff has suffered., 75  If the harassment stops, the employer's
negligence did not cause the harm, unless some prior negligence by the
employer caused the initial harassment. Also, even if the harassment
continued after notice, the employer's negligence would only cause the
subsequent harm, not the prior harm.
Further, the negligence standard is a direct liability standard, not an
agency standard: "[T]he employer's liability in cases of co-worker
harassment is direct, not derivative; the employer is being held directly
responsible for its own acts or omissions. 76 An employer is directly
liable when it has violated a duty of care owed to the employee, and if an
71. Nancy F. Chudacoff, New EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex:
Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 61 B.U. L. REV. 535, 545
(1981).
72. Under common-law agency principles, "[a]n employer is subject to vicarious
liability for a tort committed by its employee acting within the scope of employment,"
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.01 (2006), and "[an employee's act is not within
the scope of employment when it occurs within an independent course of conduct not
intended by the employee to serve any purpose of the employer." Id. § 7.07(2).
73. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 789.
74. Fuller v. City of Oakland, Cal., 47 F.3d 1522, 1528-29 (9th Cir. 1995).
75. W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 263 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER].
76. Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs., Inc., 123 F.3d 868, 873 (6th Cir. 1997).
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employer breaches such a duty, it is irrelevant that an employer would
not have been vicariously liable at common law for the coworker's
conduct. This direct liability rationale was seemingly acknowledged by
the Fifth Circuit when it stated that "federal law imposes a specific duty
upon employers to protect the workplace and the workers from sexual
harassment .... Thus, an "employer ... has a duty to maintain a
harassment-free working environment.,
78
However, to be a legitimate basis for the coworker harassment
liability rule, the breach of duty theory must effect a duty imposed by the
statutes. Whether a sound interpretation of the statutes can support a
duty to maintain a harassment-free workplace is questionable because the
statutes only allow for liability when an employer or its agent engaged in
intentional discrimination. At least if the conduct continues after the
employer had notice, it can be argued the employer made submission to
discrimination a condition of employment, meaning the employer itself
engaged in the discrimination. But because liability attaches when the
employer fails to act, even if the harassment stops, 79 this is not an
adequate explanation for the liability rule.
The liability rule has also been premised on the doctrines of
ratification or acquiescence. 80  "The failure to investigate gives tacit
support to the discrimination because the absence of sanctions
encourages abusive behavior. ' '81 A commentator has suggested that a
failure to remedy the harassment is the equivalent of participating in it:
"If the employer has actual knowledge that an employee is harassing
other employees and does nothing to prevent or rectify it, the employer,
in one sense, participates in the harassment and through its own fault is
directly liable. 82
Ratification does not apply in this situation, however, because
ratification applies only if the "actor acted or purported to act as an agent
on the person's behalf., 83  Acquiescence does not apply because it
applies when a party's tacit consent to a transaction is "intended, in some
extent at least, to carry it into effect, and to obtain or claim the benefits
77. Garziano v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 818 F.2d 380, 387 (5th Cir. 1987).
78. Merriman & Yang, supra note 49, at 98.
79. Fuller v. City of Oakland, Cal., 47 F.3d 1522, 1528-29 (9th Cir. 1995).
80. Figueroa v. Paychex, Inc., No. CV-99-797-ST, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14216, at
*11 (D. Or. Aug. 5, 1999), adopted, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14235 (D. Or. Sept. 7, 1999).
81. Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459, 466 (E.D. Mich. 1977);
see also Kyriazi v. W. Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894, 935 (D.N.J. 1978) (stating that a
failure to take action demonstrates implicit encouragement of the conduct).
82. Katherine S. Anderson, Note, Employer Liability Under Title VII for Sexual
Harassment After Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1258, 1274-75
(1987).
83. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.03 (2006).
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resulting from it .... ,,84 When an employer fails to respond to coworker
harassment, the employer is not usually intending to carry the harassment
into effect, or to obtain or claim any benefits from it.
There is, however, the potential to reconcile the coworker
harassment liability rule with traditional agency principles. In some
instances "the scope of employment has been defined broadly enough to
hold employers vicariously liable for intentional torts that were in no
sense inspired by any purpose to serve the employer., 85 "The rationales
for these decisions have varied, with some courts .. . explaining that the
employee's acts were foreseeable and that the employer should in
fairness bear the resulting costs of doing business .... ,,86 Discriminatory
harassment can perhaps be considered foreseeable, and the loss, in
fairness, shifted to the employer. Although the employer is absolved of
liability if it takes prompt remedial action, this can be considered a
limitation on liability that promotes the statutes' purposes. Prompt
remedial action provides an employer-created remedy for the employee,
and deters future wrongdoing by sending the message that the employer
does not tolerate harassment.87
This agency-law rationale cannot be used, however, because the
same liability rule applies when a third party harasses an employee.88 A
rule holding an employer liable for third-party harassment of an
employee cannot be based on agency law because a third-party harasser
is in no sense the employer's agent, and an employer is not liable for the
tortious conduct of a person who is not its servant.89
Thus, attempting to base the liability rule for coworker and third-
party harassment on agency law is unsuccessful. 90 For example, when
84. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 24 (6th ed. 1990).
85. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 794 (1998).
86. Id. at 796.
87. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-06 (1998) (noting
that Title VII's purposes are compensating victims and deterring future
wrongdoing).
88. See Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 538 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that an
employer is liable for harassment by non-employee if it knew of the harassment, or
should have known of the harassment, and failed to take corrective action), cert. denied,
127 S. Ct. 1918 (2007); Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1074 (10th Cir. 1998)
(same); BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
EMPLOYMENT LAW 250-51 (1992) ("Where employers can control the conduct of
nonemployees, the analysis strongly resembles that used in determining employer
liability for co-worker harassment.").
89. See Fleming James, Jr., Vicarious Liability, 28 TUL. L. REV. 161, 178 (1954)
(listing cases).
90. The rationale has been linked to ratification or acquiescence: "[An employer
may be held liable for sexual harassment on the part of a private individual ... where the
employer either ratifies or acquiesces in the harassment by not taking immediate and/or
corrective actions when it knew or should have known of the conduct." Folkerson v.
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the Sixth Circuit stated that the rule means the plaintiff must prove
"respondeat superior liability," 91 a commentator correctly remarked that
"[t]he use of the 'respondeat superior' label in the context of the
knowledge standard is confusing since the knowledge standard measures
the employer's own direct fault." 92 As stated by Judge Posner, "in the
case of coworker as distinct from supervisor harassment, the employer is
liable only if negligent; respondeat superior is not applied., 93 Once it is
concluded that neither an employer's own intentional discrimination nor
agency law is the basis for the coworker and third-party harassment
liability rule, it becomes clear that the rule is premised not on the
statutes' plain meaning, but on an effort to promote the statutes' twin
purposes-compensation and deterrence.
94
It is beyond the scope of this article to address whether the liability
rule for coworker and third-party harassment, being premised not on the
statutes' plain meaning, is legitimate.95 What is important for present
purposes is to recognize that, assuming it is sound, the rule is an
aggressive form of purposivism96 at the edge of legitimacy, and any
attempt to import the rule into other areas-such as holding staffing
firms liable for a client's tangible act of discrimination-should be
greeted with caution.
II
In 1997, the EEOC issued enforcement guidance regarding the
application of the employment discrimination statutes to workers placed
by staffing firns.97 The EEOC, in its enforcement guidance, correctly
Circus Circus Enters., Inc., 107 F.3d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1997).
91. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 621 (6th Cir. 1986), abrogated on
other grounds by Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
92. Anderson, supra note 82, at 1262 n.30 (1987).
93. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 189 (6th ed. 2003).
94. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-06 (1998) (noting that
Title VII's purposes are compensating victims and deterring future wrongdoing).
95. It is also beyond the scope of this article to address (1) whether the Ninth Circuit
in Fuller v. City of Oakland, Cal., 47 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1995), incorrectly held that an
employer who fails to respond to a harassment complaint is liable even if the harassment
stops after the employer knew or should have known of it, and (2) whether courts have
correctly held that an employer can be liable for third-party harassment. For purposes of
this article, the scope of which is limited to addressing whether a staffing firm should be
liable for a client's discriminatory termination of an employee assignment, I accept these
holdings as correct.
96. A purposive approach to interpreting a statute focuses on the statute's purpose
when the text does not provide a clear answer. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE
LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 85-101 (2005) (describing and
advocating a purposive approach to statutory interpretation).
97. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 3.
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states that a threshold question is whether the worker is an "employee."
98
As recognized by the EEOC, however, the issue at this stage of the
analysis is simply whether the worker is an employee of either the
staffing firm or the client;99 which entity employs the worker, or whether
both employ him or her, is irrelevant. As stated by the EEOC, "[t]he
worker is a covered employee under the anti-discrimination statutes if the
right to control the means and manner of her work performance rests
with the firm and/or its client rather than with the worker herself."100
The first issue, therefore, is whether the statutes apply, or whether the
worker is beyond their protection because the relationship that was the
subject of the alleged discrimination is not an employment relationship.
The EEOC believes such workers will be "employees" within the
meaning of the statutes in the great majority of cases.' 0 '
The EEOC then states that it must be determined which entity or
entities employ the worker.'0 2 If the staffing firm does not have the right
to exercise control over the worker, it would not be the worker's
employer under the statutes. 10 3 This would be the result even if the
staffing firm treats the worker as its employee for payroll and benefits
purposes, as often happens with so-called "employee leasing"
arrangements. 104
The EEOC does not at this point state why it is relevant which
entity or entities employ the worker. 10 5 The EEOC simply notes that if
the staffing firm "qualifies as the worker's employer, and if that entity
has the statutory minimum number of employees, then it can be held
liable for unlawful discriminatory conduct against the worker."' 1 6 The
EEOC, however, suggests this inquiry's lack of relevance by noting that
an employer can be liable for interfering with a worker's employment
with another entity. 107
The EEOC then discusses liability. The Commission believes "a
staffing firm is liable if it honors a client's discriminatory assignment
request or if it knows that its client has rejected workers in a protected
class for discriminatory reasons and for that reason refuses to assign
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the staffing firm to be liable because it participated in the client's
discrimination.' 09
The Commission also believes, however, that if a client
discriminates against an assigned worker, the staffing firm "is liable if it
knew or should have known about the client's discrimination and failed
to undertake prompt corrective measures within its control," 1 0 provided
the firm is the worker's employer under the statutes."' Thus, whether
the worker is the firm's employee determines if the firm must take
corrective action when a client discriminates against the worker.
The EEOC then elaborates on the types of corrective measures that
can be taken by the staffing firm to avoid liability, stating:
Corrective measures may include, but are not limited to: 1) ensuring
that the client is aware of the alleged misconduct; 2) asserting the
firm's commitment to protect its workers from unlawful harassment
and other forms of prohibited discrimination; 3) insisting that prompt
investigative and corrective measures be undertaken; and 4) affording
the worker an opportunity, if (s)he so desires, to take a different job
assignment at the same rate of pay.
112
The EEOC further notes:
The staffing firm should not assign other workers to that work site
unless the client has undertaken the necessary corrective and
preventive measures to ensure that the discrimination will not recur.
Otherwise, the staffing firm will be liable along with the client if a
worker later assigned to that client is subjected to similar
misconduct. 113
For this latter proposition, the EEOC cites Paroline v. Unisys Corp.,114 in
which the court held that an employer is liable if it anticipated or
reasonably should have anticipated that the plaintiff would be subjected
to sexual harassment, yet failed to take action to prevent it.' 15
Under the above guidelines, the Commission believes a staffing
firm would be liable for a client's harassment and discharge of a worker
when: the employee is employed by the staffing firm; the employee
complains to the staffing firm; the firm tells the worker it cannot force
the client to take corrective action; the firm removes the worker from the
109. Id. atN:3324.
110. Id.
111. See id. at n.32.
112. See id. at N:3324-N:3325.
113. Id. atN:3325.
114. 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1989), vacated in part on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th
Cir. 1990) (en banc).
115. Paroline, 879 F.2d at 107.
[Vol. 112:2
PAYING FOR THE SINS OF THEIR CLIENTS
assignment at the client's request (the client referred to the worker as a
troublemaker in the EEOC's example); and the firm finds the worker a
different assignment.' 16 The EEOC believes the firm should be "liable
for the harassment and retaliatory discharge because it knew of the
misconduct and failed to undertake adequate corrective action."
' 1 7
According to the EEOC, the firm
should have insisted that the client investigate the allegation of
harassment and take immediate and appropriate corrective action.
The agency should also have asserted the right of its workers to be
free from unlawful discrimination and harassment, and declined to
assign other workers until the client undertook the necessary
corrective and preventive measures.18
The EEOC also believes that the firm "unlawfully participated in its
client's discriminatory misconduct when it acceded to the client's request
to replace the worker with one who was not a 'troublemaker.""'
9
Further, "[i]f the replacement worker is subjected to similar harassment,
the [firm] ... will be subject to additional liability."' 2
The Commission does not disclose the basis for its conclusion that a
staffing firm must take corrective action when it has reason to know a
client terminated an employee's assignment for an unlawful reason.
1 21
The EEOC does, however, cite to its Guidelines on Sexual
Harassment,12 2 which provide that an employer may be liable for the
sexual harassment of an employee by a third party if the employer knew
or should have known of the harassment and failed to take immediate
and appropriate corrective action within its control.1 23 The Guidelines on
Sexual Harassment do not, however, address tangible acts of
discrimination (except for tangible acts involved with harassment), 24 and
thus do not provide direct support for the EEOC's position.
The EEOC also cites three court decisions-EEOC v. Sage Realty
116. EEOC Guidance, supra note 3, at N:3325.




121. In a subsequent case, however, the EEOC relied on the concept of ratification,
arguing that a staffing firm who fails to take corrective measures within its control ratifies
the discriminatory conduct. See Pl.'s Mem. Resp. Opp'n Def. Adecco's Mot. Summ. J. at
24, EEOC v. Olver, Inc., No. 7:05CV00417 (W.D. Va. filed June 30, 2005), available at
https://ecfvawd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/login.pl (doc. 43).
122. EEOC Guidance, supra note 3, at N:3324 n.33 (citing EEOC Guidelines on
Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1996)).
123. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (e) (2007).
124. Id. § 1604.11(a), (g) (2007).
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Corp.,125 Magnuson v. Peak Technical Services, Inc.,126 and Caldwell v.
ServiceMaster Corp.,'2 7 -as well as a decision by the National Labor
Relations Board-Capitol EMI Music, Inc. 28 As discussed below, these
decisions do not provide direct support for the EEOC's position.
In EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp.,1 29 the court held that a cleaning
contractor who employed a lobby attendant, and the building
management company who had the principal role in supervising her,
were jointly liable when the contractor fired her for refusing to comply
with the management company's directive that she wear a revealing
uniform that resulted in her being sexually harassed by the public. 30
Although the management company was responsible for the uniform
requirement, the cleaning contractor was held liable because it was her
employer, it was aware of the harassment, and there was no evidence it
was powerless to remedy the situation.1
31
Thus, Sage Realty Corp. stands for the proposition that an employer
is liable for the sexual harassment of an employee by third parties, if it
knew of the harassment, had the power to remedy it, and failed to take
action to stop it. With respect to the plaintiffs termination, Sage Realty
Corp. shows that an employer cannot terminate an employee "for
refusing to comply with . . . sex-based terms and conditions of
employment .. ,,32 Although the contractor's termination of the
plaintiff could be likened to a staffing firm complying with a client's
termination of an employee assignment for an unlawful reason, the
contractor did not merely remove her from the assignment; it terminated
her employment with the contractor. Thus, the contractor itself took an
adverse employment action against the plaintiff. Therefore, Sage Realty
Corp. does not stand for the proposition that an employer can be liable
for another entity's tangible act of discrimination.
In Magnuson v. Peak Technical Services, Inc.133 a staffing firm
assigned the plaintiff to a client who owned car dealerships. 34 The
plaintiff alleged that the general manager of the dealership to which she
was assigned sexually harassed her.' 35 She complained to the client and
the staffing firm, but they failed to take action, and the harassment
125. 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
126. 808 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Va. 1992), aff'd, 40 F.3d 1244 (4th Cir. 1994).
127. 966 F. Supp. 33 (D.D.C. 1997).
128. 311 N.L.R.B. 997 (1993), enforced, 23 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 1994).
129. 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
130. Id. at 611.
131. Id. at 613.
132. Id. at 608.
133. 808 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Va. 1992), aff'd, 40 F.3d 1244 (4th Cir. 1994).
134. Id. at 504.
135. Id. at 505.
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continued. 136 The staffing firm later removed her from the dealership at
the general manager's request and assigned her to work at other
dealerships. 137 The staffing firm later terminated her, claiming she no
longer "fit the profile" of what the client sought for the position.1 38 The
plaintiff then sued the firm and others for violating Title VII, alleging
sexual harassment, discriminatory discharge, and retaliation.
139
The court, addressing the firm's motion for summary judgment,
began by stating that "[i]n order to be subject to liability under Title VII,
a defendant must (1) fall within Title VII's statutory definition of
'employer,' and (2) have exercised substantial control over significant
aspects of the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of plaintiff's
employment."' 140 The court found that the firm fell within the statutory
definition of "employer" because it employed fifteen or more employees
during the relevant time period.
14 1
The court then noted that it still had to determine if the firm was the
plaintiffs employer for Title VII purposes, i.e., whether it exercised
sufficient control over her employment. 142 The court stated that because
of Title VII's broad remedial purposes, "the term 'employer' under Title
VII should be 'construed in a functional sense to encompass persons who
are not employers in conventional terms, but who nevertheless control
some aspect of an individual's compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment.""'i 43 The court also noted that more than one
employer can employ the plaintiff for Title VII purposes. 144 The court
stated that no one disputed that the firm was the plaintiffs employer,
referencing the paychecks and benefits it provided to the plaintiff, the
written employment agreement with the plaintiff, and the firm
supervisors to whom the plaintiff reported. 1
45
The court next addressed whether the firm could be held liable for
136. Id. at 506.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 503.
140. Id. at 507. This statement of law is incorrect. The second factor fails to take into




143. Id. at 507-08 (quoting Bostick v. Rappleyea, 629 F. Supp. 1328, 1334 (N.D.N.Y.
1985), affd, 907 F.2d 144 (1990) (in turn quoting Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity
Assocs., 475 F. Supp. 1298, 1308 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on
other grounds, 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
463 U.S. 1223 (1983)).
144. Magnuson, 800 F. Supp. at 508.
145. Id.
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the alleged harassment, 46 stating that the firm could be liable if it knew
of the harassment and failed to take corrective action. 47 Because there
was evidence that the plaintiff told the firm about the harassment, and
because it was undisputed the firm did not take remedial action, there
was sufficient evidence to sustain the harassment claim.1
4 8
Additionally, the court held there was sufficient evidence to support
a discriminatory discharge claim against the firm because there was
evidence the plaintiff's supervisor at the firm had expressed doubts about
placing women at male-dominated dealerships.149 The court also held
there was sufficient evidence to support a retaliatory discharge claim
against the firm." 0
Magnuson stands for the propositions that a staffing firm must take
prompt remedial action when a client sexually harasses a worker,
provided the worker is the staffing firm's employee, and the firm cannot
terminate the employee for discriminatory or retaliatory reasons.
Magnuson, however, did not address the liability of a firm for a client's
tangible act of discrimination with which the firm was uninvolved, and
thus does not support the EEOC's position.
In Caldwell v. ServiceMaster Corp., 5' four plaintiffs sued a staffing
firm for allegedly failing to correct the discriminatory environment that
existed at the assignment with a client, and for failing to address adverse
actions taken against them by the client.' 52 The firm, conceding there
was a factual issue as to whether it was a joint employer of the plaintiffs,
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that it was not on notice of
any alleged discrimination and that, even if it had been, it took corrective
action within its control. 153 The court stated that "[t]o prevail on a theory
of joint employer liability, a plaintiff must show that the defendant knew
or should have known of the discriminatory conduct and that it failed to
take those corrective measures within its control.' 54  For this
proposition, the court cited to Magnuson and Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton
Corp., 55 the latter involving whether an employer can be liable for
sexual harassment by a customer at the employer's workplace.
56
The court granted summary judgment for the firm because the
146. Id. at 512.
147. Id. at 513.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 514.
150. Id. at 515.
151. 966 F. Supp. 33 (D.D.C. 1997).
152. Id. at 35-6.
153. Id. at 46.
154. Id.
155. 841 F. Supp. 1024 (D. Nev. 1992).
156. Id. at 1027-28.
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plaintiffs had not provided it with sufficient notice of the client's
discrimination. 157 Further, even if the firm had determined the client
terminated the plaintiffs for discriminatory reasons, the firm had no
authority under its agreement with the client to oversee it or force it to
change its request that the plaintiffs not be assigned to it.158 The court
also noted that the firm offered alternative positions to the plaintiffs. 159
Additionally, the court stated that the firm investigated the basis for the
terminations, and found no proof of discrimination.16
0
Thus, while Caldwell purportedly applied the corrective action
standard to a client's tangible acts of discrimination, the court's grant of
summary judgment for the firm arguably renders such application dicta.
Also, the court seemingly acknowledged that the standard has little effect
because a staffing firm has no control over a client. Lastly, the cases
relied on by the court in support of the corrective action standard
involved either tangible acts of discrimination by the staffing firm or
harassment, not a tangible act of discrimination by the client.
In Capitol EMI Music, Inc.'61 the National Labor Relations Board
(Board) addressed "the circumstances under which [it would] deem both
employers in a joint employer relationship to have committed a violation
of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the [National Labor Relations] Act [NLRA]
when only one of those employers took the unlawful action in
question."'1 62 The case involved a temporary employment agency that
assigned a temporary employee to a position with a client company.
163
The Board concluded that the agency and the client were joint employers
of the employee. 164 The client asked that the employee be removed from
the assignment for unlawful reasons, but those reasons were not told to
the agency, and it had no knowledge of those reasons. 165 There was no
evidence or argument that the agency engaged in wrongdoing; 66 thus,
the issue was whether the agency should be liable for the client's
157. Caldwell, 966 F. Supp. at 46-47.
158. Id. at 48.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. 311 N.L.R.B. 997 (1993), enforced, 23 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 1994).
162. Id. at 997. Section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer, "by
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization[.]" 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2000). Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7[.]" Id. § 158(a)(1).
163. 311N.L.R.B. at997.
164. Id. at 998 n.7.
165. Id. at 998.
166. Id.
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wrongdoing simply because it was a joint employer of the employee. 167
The Board stated that where "one joint employer merely supplies
employees to its coemployer and otherwise takes no part in the daily
direction of the employees, does not participate in their oversight, and
has no representatives at the worksite,"'168 the staffing firm is liable only
if (1) the staffing firm "knew or should have known that the other
employer acted against the employee for unlawful reasons"; and (2) the
staffing firm "acquiesced in the unlawful action by failing to protest it or
to exercise any contractual right it might possess to resist it.' ' 169 The
Board, however, stated that when the non-acting entity jointly manages
the employees at the work site, and has representatives at the work site, it
might be held liable because it could benefit from "warding off union
representation from the jointly, managed employees."' 7 ° It is also "in a
position to hear of, inquire into, and investigate reports of its
coemployer's unlawful actions."'17' The Board noted that "[a]scribing
vicarious liability to the joint employer in these circumstances requires it
to undo or otherwise remedy unlawful actions of which it is in the best
position to know and from which it might gain advantage."' 72
While EMI Music suggests support for applying the corrective
action standard to tangible employment actions under the employment
discrimination statutes, an NLRA decision is of limited value in
interpreting such statutes. For example, section 8(a)(1) can be violated
without discriminatory motive, 173 whereas a disparate-treatment claim
under the employment discrimination statutes requires such a motive.
174
The Board also held that agency principles did not "apply to the statutory
liability issue here."'' 75  Agency principles, however, apply to the
employment discrimination statutes.
176
Thus, while the authority relied on by the EEOC provides some
support for applying the corrective action standard to a client's tangible
acts of discrimination, they do not provide direct support, and certainly
do not provide sufficient support for applying the standard without
further exploring the legitimacy of such an application.
167. Id. at 999.
168. Id. at 1000 (footnote omitted).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 999.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269 (1965).
174. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988).
175. 311 N.L.R.B. at 1000 n.18.
176. See supra Part I.D.
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III
I will now review other cases involving staffing firms and the
employment discrimination statutes to determine if there is any other
support within the case law for the EEOC's position.
'7In Astrowsky v. First Portland Mortgage Corp., an employee
leasing company leased the plaintiff to a mortgage company. 178  The
mortgage company used the leasing company for payroll and benefits
services. 7 9 The leasing company did not direct, control, or supervise the
plaintiffs work, though it paid his commission checks and made the
required withholdings. °8 0  After missing work without permission, the
mortgage company fired the plaintiff,181 a decision in which the leasing
company played no role. 82 The plaintiff sued the employee leasing
company and other entities for discrimination.8 3
The court, in granting the leasing company's motion for summary
judgment,'8 4 held that even if the company was an "employer" because it
employed fifteen or more employees, it did not exercise sufficient
control over the plaintiffs employment to be considered his employer
under the applicable federal statutes. 8 5 The court relied on the fact that
the mortgage company, not the leasing company, supervised the
plaintiff. 8 6 Therefore, the EEOC's position that the corrective action
standard applies to a client's tangible acts of discrimination finds no
support in Astrowsky because the leasing company was not held liable
for the mortgage company's alleged discrimination.
In Williams v. Caruso'8 7 the plaintiff worked for a temporary
employment firm and was placed with a client.188 The firm played no
role in the manner and means by which the plaintiffs work was
accomplished; she was trained and supervised by an employee of the
client; and the firm was not accountable on a daily basis to any of the
client's employees. 8 9  The firm did, however, have a policy that
provided that a temporary employee who was sexually harassed on an
assignment should notify his or her firm supervisor, and the supervisor
177. 887 F. Supp. 332 (D. Me. 1995).
178. Id. at 333.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 334.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 333.
184. Id. at 337.
185. Id. at 335-36.
186. Id. at 336.
187. 966 F. Supp. 287 (D. Del. 1997).
188. Id. at 289.
189. Id. at 296.
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would work with the client to investigate the complaint and safeguard the
employee, including, if necessary, removing the employee from the
worksite. 190
The plaintiff alleged that the employee who trained her (and who
was employed by the client) sexually harassed her.191 The plaintiff first
complained to the client, and then to the firm. 19 2 On the day the plaintiff
complained to the firm, the client told the firm that it wanted to terminate
the plaintiffs assignment, and the firm apparently complied.1 93 About a
month later the firm offered the plaintiff another assignment, but she
declined. 194
The plaintiff then sued the firm, among others, for sex
discrimination and retaliatory discharge under Title VII.195 The court
began its discussion of the sex-discrimination claim by stating that
"[w]hether [the plaintiff] can sue [the firm] as her employer turns on an
evaluation of common law agency principles."'1 96  The court thus
suggested that for the plaintiff to be able to sue the firm, she had to
establish that she was the firm's employee. 197 Although the plaintiff
alleged that the firm was her employer because it issued her
paychecks,198 the court held that under agency principles this was
insufficient, and she could not sue the firm. 199 The court then rejected
her retaliatory discharge claim because there was insufficient evidence
that she was constructively discharged. 20 0 Thus, because the court ruled
in the firm's favor, Caruso20 ' does not support the EEOC's position that
the corrective action standard applies to a client's tangible acts of
discrimination.
In Mullis v. Mechanics & Farmers Bank,202 the plaintiff was a
temporary secretary assigned by a staffing firm to a client.2 °3  The
plaintiff alleged that her supervisor, who was an employee of the client,
190. Id. at 298.




195. Id. at 294.
196. Id. at 295.
197. See id. at 295 n.5 (discussing the test for determining if a person is an employee
for purposes of suing under Title VII and the ADEA).
198. Id. at 296.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 298.
201. I refer to this case as Caruso instead of Williams because another case that will
be discussed also has Williams as the first name of the case.
202. 994 F. Supp. 680 (M.D.N.C. 1997).
203. Id. at 683.
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sexually harassed her.2°4 She alleged that she complained to the staffing
firm, but it failed to act.205 She then sued the firm for discrimination
under Title VII.
20 6
In deciding whether the plaintiff stated a claim against the firm, the
court first addressed whether the firm was the plaintiffs employer.20 7
The court held that under the loaned-servant doctrine, 0 8 the firm and the
client were both the plaintiffs employer.20 9 The court then held that
because an employer can be liable for the harassment of an employee by
a third party if the employer knew or should have known of the alleged
harassment, the plaintiffs allegations stated a claim against the firm.210
This case does not, however, support the EEOC's position because it
involved sexual harassment and not a tangible act of discrimination.
In Williams v. Grimes Aerospace Co. 211 a temporary employment
agency placed the plaintiff with a client. 2  The plaintiff completed all
employment-related paperwork at the employment agency, but the
agency did not provide her with any written employment policies or
procedures.213 She used the client's time clock, and the employment
agency received the time and payment information from the client and
paid her.214 She served three different assignments with the client.215
During the last two, she applied for five different full-time positions with
the client,216 but did not receive such a position until after complaining
and filing a charge of discrimination. 17 She later filed suit against the
agency and the client for race discrimination based on the client failing to
offer her a full-time position until after she filed a charge of
discrimination.218
The court first rejected the plaintiffs argument that the agency and
the client were liable as one another's agents.219 The court relied on the
forum state's law, which provided that a party is an agent only if the
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 683-684.
207. Id. at 684.
208. Under the loaned-servant doctrine, "an employee directed or permitted to
perform services for another 'special employer' may become the special employer's
employee while performing those services." Id. at 685.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 686.
211. 988 F. Supp. 925 (D.S.C. 1997).
212. Id. at 931.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 932.
216. Id. at 939.
217. Id. at 932.
218. Id. at 930.
219. Id. at933.
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220other party has a right to control the conduct of the purported agent.
The court held that neither company was under the other's control.221
The court, relying on Magnuson, then stated that "[a] defendant may
be held liable under Title VII if it (1) fits within the 'employer' definition
of Title VII and (2) 'exercises substantial control over significant aspects
of the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of plaintiffs
employment. ,,222 The court first held that the agency was an "employer"
as that term is defined under Title VII. 223 The court then held there was a
factual issue whether the agency had the requisite control over the
plaintiff to be her employer under the statute.224 The court noted that the
agency paid her wages, benefits, and taxes, handled any complaints she
had, and retained the right to hire and fire her.225
The court then held that the plaintiff could not establish a
discrimination claim against the agency because an employer is only
liable for discrimination if it knew or should have known of the
discrimination and failed to take corrective measures within its control,
and there was no evidence the agency was aware of the plaintiffs efforts
to be hired into a full-time position with the client.226 Thus, like
Caldwell, while the court's use of the corrective action standard to a
tangible employment action provides support for the EEOC's position,
the grant of summary judgment for the employer weakens that support.
In Riesgo v. Heidelberg Harris, Inc.,227 a temporary employment
agency recruited, screened, and referred the plaintiff to a client for a
temporary assignment.228 The client's employees allegedly harassed the
plaintiff because of his race and national origin, 229 and he complained to
the agency. 230 The agency forwarded the complaint to the client, 231 and
the client's employee relations manager told the plaintiff that she would
investigate immediately.232 The agency's president later called the
220. Id. (citing Fernander v. Thigpen, 293 S.E.2d 424, 426 (S.C. 1982)).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 934 (quoting Magnuson v. Peak Tech. Servs., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 500, 507
(E.D. Va. 1992), affd, 40 F.3d 1244 (4th Cir. 1994)).
223. Id. at 935.
224. Id. at 936.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 937-38. The court, discussing Kellam v. Snelling Personnel Services, 866
F. Supp. 812, 816 (D. Del. 1994), aff'd, 65 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 1995), mistakenly stated
that if a temporary employment agency is not the assigned workers' employer, it "cannot
be held liable for Title VII discrimination." 988 F. Supp. at 938 n.9. This is contrary to
the "interference" theory discussed previously.
227. 36 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.N.H. 1997).
228. Id. at 55.
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plaintiff to check on the client's response to the complaint, and to ask
him if he wanted to continue working for the client.23 3 The plaintiff said
that he would "play it by ear," and did not complain again.234 Though
the client took action to stop the harassment, the plaintiff alleged that it
continued.23 5 The client later terminated the plaintiffs assignment, and
the agency offered to place him in another position.
2 36
The plaintiff then sued the agency asserting, among other claims,
claims for hostile-work-environment discrimination and retaliation.23 7
The court held it was unnecessary to address if the agency was the
plaintiff's employer because, even if it was, it had responded
appropriately. 238 Though the plaintiff argued that the agency "could
have, inter alia, conducted its own investigation in response to the events
alleged by the plaintiff, more accurately passed on the plaintiff's reaction
to [the client's] response, or placed pressure on [the client] by
threatening to remove its employees," the court found "these proposals
impose a wholly unrealistic burden on [the agency.], 239 The court noted
that the agency "had virtually no control over the plaintiffs activities at
work and was not the employer of any of the [client's] employees
responsible for the harassment., 240  The court pointed out that the
agency's "president was not authorized to enter [the client's] premises
without [the client's] permission, and did not have the right to take direct
action against [the client's] direct employees. 24'
Thus, Riesgo does not support the EEOC's position. The court not
only ruled in the agency's favor, it suggested that the corrective action
standard placed an unrealistic burden on the staffing firm.
In Neal v. Manpower International, Inc.,242 the plaintiff sued a
temporary employee company, Manpower International (Manpower),
and a client of Manpower's, with whom she had been placed. 4 3
Manpower was uninvolved in the client's management or operations, and
did not have authority or control over the client's employees.2 44
Manpower did, however, have an office at the client's facility and





237. Id. at 56-58.
238. Id. at 58.
239. Id. at 59 (alteration in original).
240. Id. (alteration in original).
241. Id. (alteration in original).
242. No. 3:00-cv-277/LAC, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25805 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 17, 2001).
243. Id. at *3, *8.
244. Id. at *3.
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to identify openings.245 Manpower also "facilitated" terminations and
employee counseling.246 Additionally, Manpower provided salaries to
the temporary employees and issued rules for them, including attire and
attendance policies. 247 Except for terminations because of attendance
policy violations, Manpower took direction regarding terminations from
the client.248
Two employees of the client supervised the plaintiff.249  The
plaintiff alleged she was sexually harassed by one of them, 250 and that the
harasser later requested that Manpower remove the plaintiff from the
facility.251 In accordance with the agreement between Manpower and the
client, Manpower complied.252  Manpower offered the plaintiff
alternative employment positions, but she did not pursue the offer.2 53
She then sued Manpower and the client under a state law that was
patterned after Title VII, alleging sexual harassment and retaliation.254
The court, addressing Manpower's motion for summary judgment,
stated that the first issue was whether Manpower was an "employer"
under the state statute, and the second was if there was a basis for
holding it liable for the alleged harassment.255 The court held that it was
unnecessary to resolve the first issue because the court's finding on the
second issue rendered it moot.
2 5 6
The court then held that an employer can be liable for harassment
by a non-employee only if the employer knew or should have known of
the harassment. 257  Because Manpower did not know of the alleged
harassment until after the client terminated her assignment,258 a basis for
holding Manpower liable did not exist.
25 9
The court then rejected the plaintiffs argument that Manpower was
liable under the Supreme Court's decisions in Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton 26 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth26' as a result of the
245. Id. at *34.
246. Id. at *4.
247. Id.
248. Id. at *4-5.
249. Id. at *8.




254. Id. at *16-17.
255. Id. at *24.
256. Id. at *25.
257. Id. at *29-30.
258. Id. at *14.
259. Id. at *29-31.
260. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). In Faragher, the Court held that an employer is liable
when a supervisor takes a tangible employment action against a subordinate. Id. at 808.
261. 524 U.S. 742 (1998). As in Faragher, the Court held that an employer is liable
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client's tangible employment action against the plaintiff, i.e., the
termination of her assignment.262 The court noted that an employer is
liable for a supervisor's tangible act of discrimination because of the
power given to him or her by his or her employer,263 a theory that does
not apply when another entity's supervisor takes the action. Further,
Manpower did not have an opportunity to guard against misconduct by
the client's supervisors, or to "screen them, train them, and monitor their
performance, 2 64 relevant considerations under the standard for liability
for a supervisor's discrimination. 265  Thus, the adverse employment
action was not attributable to Manpower.266
The court further held that neither the loaned-servant doctrine267 nor
the joint employer doctrine268 provided for liability because even if
Manpower was the plaintiffs employer under the statute, the plaintiff
never informed Manpower of the harassment and it had no reason to
know of the harassment. 269 The court also granted summary judgment
for Manpower on the retaliation claim because the plaintiff conceded she
did not inform Manpower of the alleged harassment before her
assignment was terminated, and thus Manpower could not have acted
with a retaliatory motive.27°
Thus, Neil does not provide support for the EEOC's position. The
court correctly held that the client's supervisor was not the staffing
firm's agent, and his conduct, including the tangible employment action
taken by him, could therefore not be attributed to the firm.
In Watson v. Adecco Employment Services, Inc.,271 a temporary
employee placement service assigned the plaintiffs to work at a school
cafeteria pursuant to a contract between a school board and the
placement service. 272 The school board's cafeteria management trained
and supervised the plaintiffs. 273  The placement service issued the
for a supervisor's tangible employment action taken against a subordinate. Id. at 760.
The Court in Ellerth explained that this holding is premised on agency law, which
provides that an employer is responsible for an employee's tortious act when the
employee is aided in accomplishing the act by the agency relationship. Id. at 761.
262. Neal, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25805, at *32-34.
263. Id. at *32.
264. See id. at *33 (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803).
265. Id. at *33.
266. Id.
267. For an explanation of the loaned-servant doctrine, see supra note 208.
268. Under the "joint employer" doctrine, an employee is employed by two or more
separate entities. Virgo v. Riveria Beach Assocs., 30 F.3d 1350, 1359 (1 lth Cir. 1994).
269. Neal, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25805, at *34-35.
270. Id. at *35-36.
271. 252 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (M.D. Fla. 2003).
272. Id. at 1349.
273. Id.
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plaintiffs' paychecks and made applicable withholdings.274 Although the
placement service issued general guidelines about work attire, the
cafeteria's manager dictated the specific requirements.275 The plaintiffs
alleged that after they objected to wearing Santa hats as part of their
uniforms, the placement service told them to not report to their
assignment because the school board wanted their assignments
terminated.276 The plaintiffs then sued the placement service and the
school board for religious discrimination under Title VII.
277
The court, ruling on the placement service's motion for summary
judgment, held that it was not the plaintiffs' employer under Title VII
because it exercised no control over their work.2 78 The court therefore
held that it lacked jurisdiction over the placement service.279
The court further held that even if the placement service could be
considered the plaintiffs' employer under Title VII it could not be held
liable because "[f]or a joint employer to be held liable for discriminatory
conduct, a plaintiff must show that the joint employer knew or should
have known of the conduct and failed to take corrective measures within
its control., 280 The court stated that although the placement service was
aware the plaintiffs objected to wearing the hats, the plaintiffs failed to
show that the placement service failed to take corrective measures within
its control.28'
In so finding, the court noted that the corrective measures that were
available to the placement service were limited because it could not force
the school board to avoid discrimination or to run its operations in a
282particular manner. The court also noted that the placement service
contacted the school board to reach an accommodation over the dispute
about the hats.283 The court further relied on the fact that the placement
service merely reported to the plaintiffs the school board's desire to have
the assignment terminated, and thus had not taken any adverse
employment action against them.284
Thus, while Watson provides some support for the EEOC's
position, the court seemed skeptical of the corrective action standard, and
ruled in the staffing firm's favor.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1350.
277. Id. at 1351.
278. Id. at 1356.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 1356-57.
281. Id. at 1357.
282. Id. at 1357-58.
283. Id. at 1357 n.33.
284. Id. at 1357.
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In EEOC v. Olver, Inc. ,285 the employee was a receptionist who
interviewed with, and was hired directly by, a staffing firm's client, but
was then referred to the firm to complete the necessary paperwork for
placement with the client, including payroll documents.286 The firm gave
her a handbook that included the procedure for calling in sick and
reporting discrimination and harassment. 28' After four and a half days,
the client terminated her assignment,288 and she conceded she had no
reason to believe the firm played a role in the decision. 289 The firm
offered to search for a new placement for her, but she declined.29 °
The EEOC then sued the firm and the client on the employee's
behalf, alleging the client had terminated her assignment because of her
race and national origin. 291 The EEOC argued that "while [the client]
and [the firm] are distinct business entities which are independently
operated, they shared control over [the employee's] employment and
working conditions such that they are considered joint employers of
[her]. 292 Interestingly, the EEOC seemed to argue that this alone meant
the firm should be liable for the client's alleged discriminatory
293termination. The EEOC asserted that "[i]f both the staffing firm and
the client have the right to control the worker, and each has the statutory
minimum number of employees, they are both liable as 'joint
employers,"' citing its 1997 Enforcement Guidance. 294 Then, however,
the EEOC stated that the firm "maintained the right to exert control over
[the employee's] employment and it is liable as a joint employer for
failing to promptly act to rectify the alleged discriminatory
termination.,
295
The court, in addressing the firm's motion for summary judgment,
assumed that the firm was the employee's employer under Title VII,
296
but stated that "as part of its prima facie case, the EEOC must
demonstrate that [the firm] took an adverse employment action against
[the employee]. 297 The court then granted summary judgment for the
285. No. 7:05CV00417, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50495 (W.D. Va. July 24, 2006).
286. Id. at *2-3.
287. Id. at *3.
288. Id. at *5.
289. Id. at *7.
290. Id.
291. Id. at*I.
292. Mem. Supp. Pl.'s Cross Mot. Partial Summ. J. at 10, available at
https://ecf.vawd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/login.pl, doc. 39.
293. See id. ("Thus, both [the client] and [the staffing firm] are subject to liability
under Title VII for [the employee's] alleged discriminatory discharge.").
294. Id. at 12.
295. Id. at 15.
296. Olver, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50495, at *7.
297. Id.
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firm because the EEOC failed to introduce sufficient evidence to find
that the firm was involved in the decision to terminate the employee's
assignment, or that it "shared control over employees placed with [the
client] to the point of rendering [it] jointly liable for [the client's]
employment decisions. ' 98
The court rejected the EEOC's argument that the firm was jointly
liable for the termination simply because it "placed temporary employees
with [the client], administered payroll for those employees, and served as
the party to whom those employees could call in sick or report
discrimination., 299 The court held that this was not the sort of day-to-day
control over the employees that was necessary to render it jointly
responsible for her termination.3 °0
Thus, Olver does not support the EEOC's position. The court
correctly held that an employer can be liable only if it took an adverse
employment action against the employee.
An analysis of relevant case law thus demonstrates that no court has
held a staffing firm liable for a client's tangible act of discrimination.
Although courts have suggested a staffing firm can be liable if it fails to
take corrective action within its control, a review of the cases that have
suggested that the corrective action standard applies to tangible acts
shows the origin of this standard is Magnuson, a harassment case. For
example, the Watson court cited Neal for this standard; 301 Neal, however,
referred to this standard when discussing liability for sexual harassment,
citing to Magnuson and Caldwell,30 the former being a sexual
harassment case 303 and the latter being a case in which the court cited
two other sexual harassment cases for the standard (one of which was
Magnuson).3 °4 The Williams court, which also referred to the standard in
the context of a tangible employment action, cited to Caldwell and noted
that Caldwell cited to Magnuson.
30 5
Thus, these courts have, in dicta, transplanted the rule of liability for
coworker and third-party harassment to staffing firm cases involving a
client's tangible act of discrimination. They have done so, however,
without critical analysis, sometimes seemingly conceding that the
298. Id. at *8.
299. Id. at *9-10.
300. Id.
301. Watson v. Adecco Employment Servs., Inc., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1357 (M.D.
Fla. 2003).
302. Neal v. Manpower Int'l, Inc., No. 3:00-cv-277/LAC, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
25805, at *31 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 17, 2001).
303. See Magnuson v. Peak Technical Servs., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 500, 505-06 (E.D.
Va. 1992) (discussing sexual harassment allegations), aff'd, 40 F.3d 1244 (4th Cir. 1994).
304. Caldwell v. ServiceMaster Corp., 966 F. Supp. 33, 46 (D.D.C. 1997).
305. Williams v. Grimes Aerospace Co., 988 F. Supp. 925, 937 (D.S.C. 1997).
[Vol. 112:2
PAYING FOR THE SINS OF THEIR CLIENTS
standard is inappropriate because a staffing firm has no control over a
client. They have also never ruled for the plaintiff when addressing a
client's tangible act of discrimination. Therefore, there is little support in
the case law for the EEOC's position.
IV
Although there is little support in the case law for the EEOC's
position, the question remains whether its position is a sound
interpretation of the federal employment discrimination statutes.
As an initial matter, it should be emphasized that the EEOC's
position is not entitled to so-called Chevron deference, under which
courts defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute that the agency
administers as long as the statute is silent or ambiguous on the particular
issue and the agency's interpretation is a permissible construction of the
statute.3 °6 The EEOC does not have the authority to issue regulations
having the force of law that interpret Title VII's substantive provisions,
and such regulations therefore are not entitled to Chevron deference.30 7
In contrast, the EEOC has the authority to issue regulations having the
force of law that interpret the ADEA and Title I of the ADA, and such
regulations are therefore entitled to Chevron deference.30 8
306. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) (holding that when a statute is silent or ambiguous regarding a particular issue,
courts should defer to an agency interpretation of a statute it administers as long as the
agency's interpretation is based on a permissible construction of the statute).
307. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976), superseded on other
grounds by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000). The EEOC does, however, have the
authority to issue procedural regulations having the force of law to carry out Title VII's
provisions. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2000) ("The Commission shall have [the]
authority from time to time to issue, amend, or rescind suitable procedural regulations to
carry out the provisions of this subchapter. Regulations issued under this section shall be
in conformity with the standards and limitations of subchapter II of chapter 5 of Title
5.").
308. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 84 (2002) (holding that
EEOC's regulation interpreting Title I of the ADA was entitled to Chevron deference);
EEOC v. Seafarers Int'l Union, 394 F.3d 197, 202 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that EEOC's
regulation interpreting the ADEA was entitled to Chevron deference). The EEOC's
regulations under the ADEA and Title I of the ADA are entitled to Chevron deference
because those statutes provide the EEOC with the power to issue regulations to carry out
those laws. See 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2000) ("In accordance with the provisions of
subchapter II of chapter 5 of Title 5, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
may issue such rules and regulations as it may consider necessary or appropriate for
carrying out this chapter, and may establish such reasonable exemptions to and from any
or all provisions of this chapter as it may find necessary and proper in the public
interest."); 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2000) ("No later than 1 year after July 26, 1990, the
Commission shall issue regulations in an accessible format to carry out this subchapter in
accordance with subchapter II of chapter 5 of Title 5."). Which agency, if any, has the
power to issue regulations with the force of law interpreting the general provisions of the
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An EEOC position announced in interpretive guidance, however, as
opposed to a regulation, while "constitut[ing] a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance,03 °9 does not have the force of law.31° Such guidance is only
entitled to so-called "Skidmore deference." 311  Under Skidmore
deference, the weight to be accorded to the EEOC's interpretation "will
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and
all those factors which give it power to persuade ....
A critical analysis of the EEOC's position shows that it does not
withstand scrutiny under the low level of deference dictated by
Skidmore, and should therefore be rejected. As demonstrated below, the
position is not supported by the statutes' plain language; it does not
significantly advance the statutes' purposes; and the various rationales
for holding a business or person liable for particular harm do not apply.
Thus, irrespective of whether one is a "textualist," focusing almost
exclusively on a statute's text when engaging in statutory
interpretation, 31 3 or a "purposivist," focusing on the statute's purpose
when the text does not provide a clear answer,314 the result is the same.315
ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12102 (2000), has not been resolved by the Supreme Court.
See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999) ("No agency, however,
has been given authority to issue regulations implementing the generally applicable
provisions of the ADA, see §§ 12101-12102, which fall outside Titles I-V.").
309. Gen. Elec. Co., 429 U.S. at 141-42.
310. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110 n.6 (2002) ("[T]he
EEOC's interpretive guidelines do not receive Chevron deference. Such interpretations
are 'entitled to respect' under our decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140,
65 S. Ct. 161, 89 L. Ed. 124 (1944), but only to the extent that those interpretations have
the 'power to persuade."') (quoting Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587
(2000)) (citation omitted).
311. Id.
312. Gen. Elec. Co, 429 U.S. at 142 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,
140 (1944)); see, e.g., Clackamas v. Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S.
440, 449 (2003) (applying Skidmore deference to EEOC's interpretation of definition of
"employee" in EEOC's guidelines, and deferring to such interpretation because the
EEOC's position was persuasive).
313. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAw 23-25 (1997) (advocating a textualist approach to statutory
interpretation).
314. See generally BREYER, supra note 96 at 85-101 (advocating a purposive
approach to statutory interpretation).
315. I would like to thank Sylvia Denys for providing me with a copy of her draft
paper titled "The Scalia/Breyer Debate and Employment Discrimination," which she
discussed at the First Annual Colloquium on Current Scholarship in Labor &
Employment Law hosted by Marquette University Law School in 2006.
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A. The Statutes' Text
"When the statutory 'language is plain, the sole function of the
courts-at least where the disposition required by the text is not
absurd-is to enforce it according to its terms. -'316 A review of the
employment discrimination statutes demonstrates that the EEOC's
corrective action rule, at least with respect to a tangible act of
discrimination such as a discriminatory tennination of an assignment, is
inconsistent with the statutes' plain language.
The statutes prohibit an employer from discriminating against an
individual with respect to such person's employment. When a staffing
firm's client discriminates against an employee by terminating the
employee's assignment for a prohibited reason, and the staffing firm is
uninvolved in the termination decision, the firm in no way discriminates
against the person for a prohibited reason. Although "employer" is
defined as the employer and its agents,31 7 neither the client nor the
client's employee who terminated the person's assignment can be
considered the firm's agent. Thus, under the statutes' plain language, the
staffing firm cannot be held liable.
The staffing firm's acquiescence to the client's termination of the
assignment is not itself an adverse employment action, and an argument
that the staffing firm is liable because it somehow participates in the
client's wrongdoing ignores the realities of the relationship between a
staffing firm and its clients. When a client terminates an employee's
assignment, it is not accurate to say that the staffing firm has removed
the employee from the assignment; rather, the client has removed the
employee from the assignment, and the staffing firm is simply without
the power to force the client to continue the assignment.3 8
Further, the staffing firm and its agents lack the requisite
discriminatory intent for the firm to be found liable. The staffing firm is
not intending to treat the employee differently because of his or her race,
color, religion, national origin, sex, age, or disability. Rather, the
staffing firm is complying with the client's decision because it has no
other choice. The staffing firm is treating the employee the same as it
treats any employee whose assignment is terminated by a client. Thus,
316. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2459 (2006)
(quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N. A., 530 U.S. 1, 6
(2000) (in turn quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)
(in turn quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917))) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
317. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2000); 29 U.S.C.
§ 630(b) (2000).
318. Of course, if the staffing firm encouraged the client to terminate an employee's
assignment for a prohibited reason, the staffing firm might be liable.
20071
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
neither the firm nor any of its agents possess the requisite discriminatory
intent to subject the firm to liability.
The same result applies even if the staffing firm is aware that the
client is terminating the employee's assignment for a discriminatory
reason. For example, under tort law concepts of joint liability for
concerted action, mere knowledge of another's wrongdoing is
insufficient to impose liability. The standard for concerted action to
result in joint liability is as follows:
All those who, in pursuance of a common plan or design to commit a
tortious act, actively take part in it, or further it by cooperation or
request, or who lend aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer, or ratify
and adopt the wrongdoer's acts done for their benefit, are equally
liable.
319
When a client terminates an employee assignment for a
discriminatory reason, but the staffing firm does not participate in that
decision, the staffing firm and the client do not have a common plan or
design to discriminate. Although there need not be an express agreement
for joint liability under tort law, there must at least be a "tacit
understanding. '" 320 Also, merely doing what the staffing firm is required
to do cannot be considered actively taking part in the decision, furthering
it by cooperation or request, lending aid or encouragement to the client,
or ratifying and adopting an act done for its benefit (the termination is
not done for the staffing firm's benefit).
As the leading torts treatise states, mere knowledge of what the
other person is doing is insufficient to establish an agreement:
There are ... occasional statements that mere knowledge by each
party of what the other is doing is sufficient 'concert' to make each
liable for the acts of the other; but this seems clearly wrong. Such
knowledge may very well be important evidence that a tacit
understanding exists; but since there is ordinarily no duty to take
affirmative steps to interfere, mere presence at the commission of the
wrong, or failing to object to it, is not enough to charge one with
responsibility.
32 1
It then notes that "[i]t is, furthermore, essential that each particular
defendant who is to be charged with responsibility shall be proceeding
tortiously, which is to say with the intent requisite to committing a tort,
or with negligence. 322
319. PROSSER, supra note 75, at 323 (footnotes omitted).
320. Id.
321. Id. at 323-24 (footnotes omitted).
322. Id. at 324.
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The Supreme Court's recent decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co.,323 which emphasized the difference between an unlawful
employment practice and the effects of an unlawful employment
practice, demonstrates that a staffing firm's acquiescence in a client's
discriminatory termination of an employee assignment is simply an
effect of the client's unlawful employment practice, and not itself an
unlawful employment practice. In Ledbetter, the Court held that an
unlawful employment practice did not occur each time an employer
issued an employee a paycheck that was less than it would have been had
the employer not previously discriminated against the employee with
respect to pay raises.324 The Court held that the smaller paychecks that
continued to be issued as a result of prior discrimination were simply the
effects of such discrimination, and not themselves discriminatory acts
upon which liability could be based.325 The Court stated that "[a] new
violation does not occur.., upon the occurrence of subsequent
nondiscriminatory acts that entail adverse effects resulting from the past
discrimination. ' ' 26 Because a staffing firm has no power to prevent a
client from terminating an employee assignment, the firm's acquiescence
in a client's discriminatory assignment termination is simply an effect of
the client's unlawful employment practice; under Ledbetter, it would not
itself be an unlawful employment practice.
Accordingly, because neither the staffing firm nor any agent of the
firm takes an adverse employment action against the employee, or
discriminates against the employee because of the employee's race,
color, religion, national origin, sex, age, or disability, the statutes' plain
language precludes liability.
B. Promoting the Statutes' Purposes
As I have demonstrated, the liability rule for coworker and third-
party harassment, which subjects an employer to liability if it fails to take
prompt remedial action in response to a harassment complaint, cannot be
supported by agency law. Rather, this duty to act is premised on the
statutes' twin purposes of compensating victims and deterring future
discrimination.327  The statutes' purposes have, correctly or not,
overridden the statutes' plain language. In fact, commentators have
complained that incorporating common-law tort and agency principles
323. 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
324. Id. at 2169.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-06 (1998) (noting that
Title VII's purposes are to compensate victims and to deter future discrimination).
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wholesale into the employment discrimination statutes "is inconsistent
with the broad remedial purposes of Title VII. 3 28  Do these twin
purposes also warrant going beyond the statutory text (if that is ever
permissible) 329 when a staffing firm's client terminates an employee
assignment for discriminatory reasons, particularly because the statutes
are remedial statutes that should be interpreted liberally to effectuate
their purposes?
330
An initial concern is that a staffing firm will rarely have sufficient
information to determine if a client terminated an assigned employee for
a discriminatory reason. Unlike an investigation of wrongdoing by its
own employees, the staffing firm does not have the power to compel the
client to cooperate in an investigation. Under the EEOC's corrective
action standard, the staffing firm is asked to assume a role usually
assigned to the government-investigating wrongdoing and determining
whether a third party violated the law-yet it lacks the power to compel
the client to participate in the investigation. Even if the client
cooperates, the client's control over the dissemination of information to
the staffing firm will make it difficult for the firm to reach an informed
conclusion. This will make it unlikely that the statutes' purposes of
compensation and deterrence will be advanced.
Also, requiring a staffing firm to investigate its client's actions puts
the parties in roles neither will be comfortable assuming, and it is
unlikely the firm will conclude the client discriminated. The client will
almost always articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
termination, and the staffing firm, because of either an inability to
conduct a searching inquiry or the lack of a desire to conduct such an
inquiry (because the firm will not want to lose the client), will most
likely conclude discrimination did not occur. The staffing firm will hope
that the investigation, even though concluded with a finding of
innocence, will be a satisfactory corrective measure to absolve it of
liability, while at the same time not unduly straining its relationship with
the client. Thus, even when the client has discriminated, the staffing
firm will rarely reach such a conclusion, even if it is aware of its
potential liability, and the statutes' purposes will not be significantly
328. Merriman & Yang, supra note 49, at 101.
329. Even a purposivist follows the text of a statute when it is clear. See, e.g.,
BREYER, supra note 96, at 85 ("The interpretive problem arises when statutory language
does not clearly answer the question of what the statute means or how it applies.").
330. See Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 262 (10th Cir. 1987) ("In our review of
the antidiscrimination laws we must be mindful of their remedial purposes, and liberally
interpret their provisions to that end."). Most notably, Justice Scalia takes issue with the
cannon of construction that provides that remedial statutes should be interpreted liberally.
See SCALIA, supra note 313, at 27-29; Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of
Contemporary LegalAnalysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 581, 581-86 (1990).
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advanced.
Even if the staffing firm concludes discrimination occurred, the twin
purposes of the statute will not be appreciably promoted by the EEOC's
rule. With respect to remedying the harm, the staffing firm is not in a
strong position to do this. The staffing firm has no control over the
client, and cannot force it to keep the employee or pay the employee
damages. Furthermore, the employee will have a claim against the
client, and thus be fully compensated for any harm irrespective of the
staffing firm's liability (unless the client has gone out of business).
With respect to deterrence, the staffing firm's lack of control over
the client will prevent it from implementing measures to avoid
discriminatory terminations. In particular, the firm's inability to
discipline the wrongdoer means holding the firm liable is unlikely to
increase deterrence. For example, the prompt remedial action standard to
determine employer liability in coworker sexual harassment cases
33'
generally requires "some disciplinary measures against the perpetrator..
,,332 As stated by a commentator:
Examples of taking prompt remedial action include fully
investigating, reprimanding the harasser for inappropriate conduct,
and warning the harasser that a repeat incident will result in
suspension or termination. Basically, an employer should impose
sufficient penalties to assure a workplace free from sexual
harassment by persuading individual harassers to discontinue
unlawful conduct. M
While a staffing firm's protests might have an impact on deterring future
wrongdoing by the client, and might even compel the client to remedy
the wrong, the firm's lack of control over the client and its employees
means the impact will be slight, if any. Furthermore, the client's
potential liability will already advance the statutes' purposes to a
satisfactory degree.
C. Tort Law and Liability for Nonfeasance
The EEOC's position is that a staffing firm which fails to take
corrective measures within its control is essentially guilty of
331. See supra note 66.
332. Joseph G. Allegretti, Sexual Harassment of Female Employees by
Nonsupervisory Coworkers: A Theory of Liability, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 437, 470
(1982).
333. Jamie C. Chanin, Comment, What is it Good For? Absolutely Nothing:
Eliminating Disparate Treatment of Third Party Sexual Harassment and A ll Other Forms
of Third Party Harassment, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 385, 395-96 (2006) (footnote omitted).
2007]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
nonfeasance,3 34 and the EEOC might look to tort law to incorporate into
the statutes a duty to act. For example, though there has been a
reluctance to impose tort liability for nonfeasance, 335 employers have a
common-law duty to prevent third parties from harming employees.
336
"[T]he obligation is not an absolute one to insure the plaintiffs safety,
but requires only that the defendant exercise reasonable care., 337 This
common-law duty of protection likely influenced the EEOC in
announcing its corrective action standard, a standard it believes applies
only if the worker is found to be the staffing firm's employee, and which
only requires that the firm act reasonably.
Reliance on an employer's common-law duty to protect its
employees from harm is, however, a mistake. The statutes themselves
determine the scope of any duty, and, as previously demonstrated, the
duty imposed is limited to an employer and its agents not discriminating
against the plaintiff.
D. Distributing Losses Among the Beneficiaries of the Risks
Holding a staffing firm liable for a client's discrimination is a form
of vicarious liability. Thus, vicarious liability's purposes should be
considered to determine if the corrective action standard is appropriate.
One of the benefits of vicarious liability is that "the employer [is] in
a better position than the employee [who committed the wrong] to absorb
and distribute these costs.
3 38
[T]he employer is in a strategic position to take out liability insurance
that will cover broadly all the legal liability which the courts subject
334. The EEOC might take issue with the characterization of a staffing firm's conduct
in removing an employee from an assignment at a client's request as inaction as opposed
to action. The leading torts treatise discusses the difference between action and inaction
as follows:
In theory the difference between the two is fairly clear; but in practice it is not
always easy to draw the line and say whether conduct is active or passive ....
The question appears to be essentially one of whether the defendant has gone
so far in what he has actually done, and has got himself into such a relation
with the plaintiff, that he has begun to affect the interests of the plaintiff
adversely, as distinguished from merely failing to confer a benefit upon him.
PROSSER, supra note 75, at 374-75 (footnote omitted). Honoring a client's request to
remove an employee cannot be considered "action" because the client has the right to
have the employee removed from the assignment, and the staffing firm has no power to
prevent the removal. The alleged wrongdoing by the staffing firm is not its removal of
the employee from the assignment, but its failure to protest the client's action. Thus, the
alleged wrongdoing is a failure to act.
335. Id. at 375.
336. Id. at 383.
337. Id. at 385.
338. James, supra note 89, at 163.
[Vol. 112:2
PAYING FOR THE SINS OF THEIR CLIENTS
him to.. . , or to decide that his own risks are numerous enough to
warrant his becoming a self-insurer with respect to them .... [T]he
employer will tend to pass on to the consumers of his product the
costs of its production. And he will reckon among such costs what he
pays in premiums for liability insurance. This means that by and
large the losses caused by the risks of the enterprise will be
distributed on a fairly wide and equitable basis among its
beneficiaries.
339
As stated by Justice Traynor in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. ,340 with
regard to applying strict liability to a company whose defective product
injures a consumer: "The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health
may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a
needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer
and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.
3 4 1
This rationale for vicarious liability does not, however, apply to
holding staffing firms liable when a client discriminates against assigned
employees. In such circumstances, the "employees should rarely have a
problem proving to a court that they have standing to sue a client
company under [the federal anti-discrimination statutes.], 342 Thus, the
client will already absorb and distribute these costs.
E. Placing Liability with the Person in the Best Position to Prevent the
Harm
A factor considered in determining whether a person should be
liable for harm is whether that person is in the best position to prevent it.
For example, a rationale for respondeat superior
is that most employees lack the resources to pay a judgment if they
injure someone seriously. They therefore are not very responsive to
the threat of tort liability. The employer, however, can induce them
to be careful, as by firing or otherwise penalizing them for their
carelessness. Making the employer liable for his employees' torts
will give him an incentive to use such inducements.
343
The less likely it is that an employer can prevent particular
employee wrongdoing, the less justification for employer liability. Thus,
"[t]he commonest test of a relationship to which the law attaches
vicarious liability is control or the general right of control. 3 44  The
339. Id. at 163 n.12.
340. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
341. Id. at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring).
342. Pirruccello, supra note 1, at 204.
343. POSNER, supra note 93, at 188 (parenthetical omitted).
344. James, supra note 89, at 165 (emphasis omitted).
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significance of the control requirement
lies not in any connection between control and fault but rather in its
bearing on the possibility of accident prevention. There is little doubt
that employers of labor are among those strategically placed to
promote accident prevention in connection with their operations ....
[O]ne of the main reasons why the employer is in this strategic
position is his general right of control over his employees while they
are engaged about his business .... Pressure of legal liability on the
employer therefore is pressure put in the right place to avoid
accidents.
345
Respondeat superior does not apply to torts committed outside an
employee's scope of employment because "the employer lacks good
information for taking the steps to minimize them., 346  Similarly,
respondeat superior does not apply to torts committed by an employer's
independent contractors because "[t]he principal does not supervise the
details of the independent contractor's work and is therefore less likely to
be able to make him work safely than to make an employee work
safely."
347
The Supreme Court, in holding employers liable for supervisors'
harassment, relied on the "position to prevent the harm" rationale, noting
"that the employer has a greater opportunity to guard against misconduct
by supervisors than by common workers" and that "employers have
greater opportunity and incentive to screen them, train them, and monitor
their performance." 348 Holding employers liable for coworker and third-
party harassment also encourages employers to eliminate such conduct,
and places liability "on the party most able to control the work
environment .... ,,349 As stated by one judge, "the employer.., can
establish prophylactic rules which, without upsetting efficiency, could
345. Id. at 168.
346. POSNER, supra note 93, at 188.
347. Id. at 188-89; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 cmt. b (2006)
("Respondeat superior is inapplicable when a principal does not have the right to control
the actions of the agent that makes the relationship between principal and agent
performing the service one of employment .... Agents who are retained as the need
arises and who are not otherwise employees of their principal normally operate their own
business enterprises and are not, except in limited respects, integrated into the principal's
enterprise so that a task may be completed or a specified objective accomplished.
Therefore, respondeat superior does not apply.").
348. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 803 (1998).
349. Merriman & Yang, supra note 49, at 102. Although Merriman and Yang were
arguing for greater employer liability for coworker harassment than under the "knew or
should have known standard," their statements about placing liability on the party most
able to prevent the harm are equally applicable as a rationale for the "knew or should
have known standard" as opposed to a standard of no liability.
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obviate the circumstances of potential discrimination . . . .""o That judge
further stated, "the type of conduct at issue is questionable at best, and it
is not undesirable to induce careful employers to err on the side of
avoiding possibly violative conduct.",
351
A staffing firm, however, without any control over a client and its
employees, is not in a position to prevent the client or its employees from
discriminating. The entity in the best position to prevent the harm-the
client-is already subject to liability for the discrimination. Thus, the
"position to prevent the harm" rationale does not support holding the
staffing firm liable.
F. The Deep Pocket
One commentator has argued that "[i]n hard fact, the reason for the
employer's liability [under respondeat superior] is [that] the damages are
taken from a deep pocket,, 352 and "the plight of the uncompensated
accident victim presents a grave social problem. 3 53 This rationale does
not apply, however, to holding a staffing firm liable for a client's
discrimination because the employee will have a claim against the client
who, unlike an employee who is personally liable for a tort, is as likely to
be a deep pocket as the staffing firm. Consequently, there is not a
significant danger that an employee discriminated against by a staffing
firm's client will be left as an uncompensated victim.
G. Liability for Faults that May Fairly Be Regarded as Risks of the
Business
A basis for vicarious liability is "that the employer should be liable
for those faults which may fairly be regarded as risks of his business
... .,354 Thus, the test for "scope of employment," under which an
employer is held liable for an employee's torts, has been described as
"elastic. 355 It has also been stated that "'the integrating principle' of
respondeat superior is 'that the employer should be liable for those faults
that may be fairly regarded as risks of his business, whether they are
350. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (MacKinnon, J.,
concurring).
351. Id.
352. James, supra note 89, at 170 (quoting BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 154 (1916)).
353. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 cmt. b (2006)
("Respondeat superior also reflects the likelihood that an employer will be more likely to
satisfy a judgment.").
354. James, supra note 89, at 182.
355. Warren A. Seavey, Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior, " in STUDIES IN
AGENCY 129, 155 (1949).
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committed in furthering it or not."' 356 Under this rationale, an employer
is held liable because it is fair to require it "to bear the burden of
",357foreseeable social behavior ....
This rationale could arguably be used to hold a staffing firm liable
for a client's discrimination. The Supreme Court, however, rejected this
rationale for a finding that sexual harassment is within the scope of the
harasser's employment. 318  If this rationale is not used to hold an
employer liable for an employee's harassment, it should not be used to
hold an employer liable for discrimination by a third party.
H. Interpreting the Statutes Consistently
An argument can be made that because an employer is liable for a
coworker's or third-party's harassment of an employee unless it takes
prompt remedial action, consistency requires that a similar duty be
placed on a staffing firm when a client takes a tangible discriminatory
employment action against an employee of the staffing firm. While this
argument has appeal, and is perhaps the reason some courts have
suggested staffing firms have such a duty, it is ultimately unpersuasive.
An employer has a greater ability to control harassment in its
workplace, whether by employees or third parties, than a staffing firm
has an ability to control discriminatory assignment terminations by its
clients. Thus, the prompt remedial action standard for coworker and
third-party harassment promotes the statutes' purposes more than the
corrective action standard applied to assignment terminations.
The prompt remedial action requirement for harassment encourages
employers to take action designed to prevent future harassment, such as
disciplining the harasser and reemphasizing to employees its
condemnation of harassment. Such action will have a significant
deterrent effect because of the employer's power over the employees'
employment. The statutes' purposes are even likely to be promoted if
the harasser is a third party. Harassment is usually a series of acts, which
are often occurring when the employee complains. Thus, unlike the
limited corrective measures available to a staffing firm faced with a
completed tangible act of discrimination (like a terminated assignment),
an employer faced with an employee's complaint of ongoing harassment
by a third party will be in a position to stop the harassment, either
through its control of the workplace or by removing the employee from
356. Taber v. Me., 67 F.3d 1029, 1037 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting FOWLER V. HARPER,
FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 26.8 (2d ed. 1986))
(emphasis omitted).
357. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 800 (1998).
358. Id. at 801.
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contact with the third party.
Also, as the Supreme Court has stated about sexual harassment,
"Congress has left it to the courts to determine controlling agency law
principles in a new and difficult area of federal law., 35 9  Unlike
harassment, tangible acts of discrimination by a staffing firm's client
should not be considered a "new and difficult area of federal law"
justifying modification (or rejection) of agency principles.
Further, to the extent the liability rule for coworker and third-party
harassment cannot be based on agency law, and is therefore inconsistent
with the statutes, it should not be extended. As Professor Melvin
Eisenberg has shown with respect to the common law, a common-law
rule that is unsound should not be extended, 360 even though this might
result in "a model of [the legal rule's] development that can best be
described as jagged .... ,,361 Likewise, an unsound interpretation of a
statute should not be extended simply for the sake of consistency.
L The Argument that the Corrective Action Standard Places a
Minimal Burden on Staffing Firms
It might be argued that the corrective action standard, which only
requires staffing firms to take corrective measures within their control,
places a minimal burden on them, and therefore should not be rejected
simply because it might be incompatible with the statutes' text. While
such an argument is contrary to the rules of statutory interpretation, it is
faulty for yet another reason.
When a staffing firm is neither aware of a client's discrimination
nor should be aware of it, the firm cannot take any corrective measures.
If, however, there is a disputed issue of fact as to whether the firm knew
or should have known of the discrimination, the firm will not obtain
summary judgment and will have to defend the case through trial. Even
if the jury finds that the firm neither knew nor should have known of the
client's discrimination, the cost of defending the case through trial will
make the win Pyrrhic. Also, the risk of an adverse jury finding regarding
the firm's actual or constructive knowledge of the client's discrimination
will cause many staffing firms to settle prior to trial. Thus, the corrective
action standard, while appearing to impose a minimal and reasonable
burden on staffing firms, may have a substantial financial impact on
them.
V
359. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751 (1998).
360. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 70-71 (1988).
361. Id. at 71.
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As demonstrated above, the EEOC's position that a staffing firm
can be liable for failing to take corrective measures within its control
when a client terminates an employee's assignment for a discriminatory
reason has no foundation in the employment discrimination statutes.
Neither the staffing firm nor any of its agents take an adverse
employment action against the employee or acts with the requisite
discriminatory intent, and there are no compelling reasons to impose a
duty contrary to the statutes' plain language. The EEOC's position
should therefore be rejected by the courts.
